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This paper analyzes the process of recovery from the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea, and draws
some lessons from it. The fast restoration of financial stability due to early closure of non-viable
financial institutions and quick resolution of non-performing loans was critical for the speedy
recovery of the South Korean economy. The swift adjustment in fiscal and monetary policies in
addition to the large depreciation of real exchange rates also supported the fast recovery. Corporate
and government bond markets played an important role in the financial restructuring and
macroeconomic adjustment process. Structural reforms helped to alleviate the weaknesses in the
corporate sector, particularly in 
 
chaebol
 
 groups. However, the fast recovery also generated
unwelcome side-effects. Because of aggressive fiscal expansion through government-guaranteed
bonds and public credit guarantee programs, sovereign liabilities increased greatly and transparency
of the official fiscal stance deteriorated. Thanks to structural reform, corporate and financial sectors
began to recognize the importance of micro risk management, but increased risk aversion
contributed to the slowdown of corporate investment and, therefore, reduced long-run growth
perspective in South Korea. How to revive long-term growth rates remains an important question
in South Korea despite fast recovery from the crisis.
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1. Introduction
 
The sudden financial crisis was a devastating shock to the South Korean economy. The real
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate plunged to –6.7% in 1998 from the pre-crisis
average of 7–8%. The sharp contraction in GDP was largely caused by the collapse in
investment. The investment ratio dropped dramatically by more than 11 percentage points
of GDP, from over 36% in the pre-crisis period to 25% of GDP in 1998.
The initial deep contraction of investment and output in the 1997 South Korean crisis
is in general attributed to the severe liquidity crisis caused by investors’ panic and weak
balance sheet problems in the corporate and financial sector (Radelet & Sachs, 1998; Park
& Lee, 2002). As in all emerging market financial crises, the South Korean crisis is also
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characterized by massive capital inflow and then sudden outflow by panicked foreign
creditors holding short-term claims.
 
1
 
 Prior to the crisis, the South Korean economy itself
had some severe institutional weaknesses that made the economy unusually fragile to the
sudden capital outflows (Corsetti 
 
et al
 
., 1999). The balance sheets of financial institutions
were very vulnerable to the withdrawal of foreign credit. South Korean banks suffered
from double mismatch problems – currency mismatch and maturity mismatch. The high
leverage and excessive investment of South Korean firms, especially 
 
chaebol
 
-affiliated
firms, are also noted as causing some of the structural problems that made the economy
extremely vulnerable to financial panic.
The recovery process from the crisis in South Korea has been no less drastic than its
initial free-fall. South Korea managed an impressive recovery starting in 1999, only a year
after the onset of the crisis. The GDP growth rates were 9.5% in 1999 and 8.5% in 2000.
The V-shaped recovery in real GDP growth in South Korea follows the stylized pattern
observed from the previous crisis episodes (Lee & Rhee, 2002; De Gregorio & Lee, 2004)
as well as from the adjustment patterns in the other Asian crisis-hit economies (see Ito,
2007, figure 1). The speedy recovery of the South Korean economy can be attributed to
the early resolution of creditors panic. Large support packages from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) made some contribution. The first IMF program, signed on
December 3, 1997, and the second IMF program, signed on December 24, 1997, helped
reduce the short-term liquidity constraints in the economy and provided resources to stem
speculative runs on international reserves.
 
2
 
The quick improvement in the South Korean economy was also supported by the swift
adjustment of macroeconomic policies. After the onset of the crisis, tight stabilization
policies supported by the IMF were implemented, but starting in mid-1998, South Korea
quickly changed its monetary and fiscal policy stance toward expansion. In addition to
macroeconomic policies, structural reform programs also had significant effects on the
recovery path. Immediately following the crisis, the South Korean government began to
tackle non-performing loans (NPL) of financial sectors, as well as excess capacity, and
over-leveraging problems of South Korean 
 
chaebols
 
 (conglomerates), which contributed to
resolving early stage financial and corporate distress.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of macroeconomic polices and structural
reforms in the recovery process of the South Korean economy and draw appropriate
lessons.
 
3
 
 Compared to the other crisis-hit Asian economies, South Korea managed to
recover relatively quickly from the crisis (see Ito, 2007, figures 1 and 2). With the external
environments given, the government-led financial restructuring programs and macro-
economic adjustment policies played an important role in the fast recovery of the South
Korean economy. However, the fast recovery also generated unwelcome side-effects.
Because of aggressive fiscal expansion through government-guaranteed bonds and public
credit guarantee programs, sovereign liabilities increased greatly and the transparency of
official fiscal stance deteriorated. Thanks to structural reform, corporate and financial
sectors began to recognize the importance of micro risk management, but their risk aversion
contributed to the slowdown of corporate investment and thereby reduced long-run
growth perspective in South Korea.
 Crisis and Recovery: South Korean Experience
 
Jong-Wha Lee and Changyong Rhee
 
© 2007 The Authors
 
148
 
Journal Compilation © 2007 Japan Center for Economic Research
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the role of macroeconomic
policies, such as fiscal and monetary policies, in the speedy adjustment of the South
Korean economy to the crisis. Section 3 analyzes the role of financial markets in mobilizing
financial resources to the real sectors during the recovery process. We also analyze the role
of financial and corporate reforms. Each section discusses the lessons from the South
Korean experience. Section 4 concludes the paper.
 
2. The Role of Macroeconomic Policies in the Recovery Process
 
2.1 Fiscal policy
 
The section examines the role of fiscal policy in South Korea’s financial crisis and recovery.
 
Re-evaluation of fiscal position before and after the crisis
 
Many believe that South Korea maintained a conservative fiscal stance prior to the crisis
and a fiscal imbalance could not have been a cause of the financial crisis (Furman &
Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998). But some argue that the official budget deficits in
South Korea do not correctly reflect the fiscal stance as there were large hidden contingent
liabilities not captured in the official budget figures. Despite the officially reported conservative
fiscal stance, large contingent liabilities could have contributed to self-fulfilling speculative
attacks and helped to aggravate the financial crisis (Cho & Rhee, 1995; Burnside 
 
et al
 
.,
2001; Corsetti & Mackowiak, 2005).
To address these questions, we reconstructed the consolidated budget deficits in South
Korea by incorporating the quasi-fiscal activities of 55 public funds and 32 public
enterprises, using their micro balance sheet data from 1972 to 2003. For detailed calculation,
refer to Lee 
 
et al
 
. (2006).
Figure 1 shows the reconstructed consolidated budget balance in South Korea that
includes the public enterprises and public funds neglected in official budget figures. The
solid line represents the ratio of the official consolidated budget deficit to GDP. The ratio
of the reconstructed consolidated budget deficit to GDP when only public enterprises are
included is shown by the thin dotted line. The thick dotted line shows the ratio of the
reconstructed figures when both public enterprises and public funds are included.
Figure 1 shows many interesting features. First, we find that newly estimated budget
deficits are significantly higher than the official figures throughout the sample period. This
finding casts doubt on the view that the South Korean government had maintained a very
sound fiscal position before the crisis and, therefore, a weak fiscal position cannot have
been a cause of the financial crisis in South Korea.
We also note, however, that the discrepancy between the official consolidated budget
deficits and the newly estimated figures is distinct only throughout the 1970s and early
1980s. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, there is no significant difference. Even in the
1970s and early 1980s, the difference is mainly due to the social overhead capital expenditures
of public enterprises, not hidden contingent liabilities. It is true that the official budget
deficits have not correctly reflected the true fiscal stance as they do not include the
quasifiscal activities of public funds and public enterprises. Nevertheless, the magnitude
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of the corrected fiscal deficit is not large enough to suggest that fiscal profligacy and hidden
contingent liabilities were the main cause of the 1997 crisis in South Korea.
Interestingly, however, the discrepancy between the two measures dramatically
increased after the crisis. The increase is largely due the issuance of a massive volume of
government-guaranteed bonds by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) and
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) to finance the public funds for
financial restructuring after the crisis. This issuance of government-guaranteed bonds is
not included in official budget deficit figures. In addition, to support financially distressed
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME), there was a significant increase in government
loan guarantees during the crisis.
 
Countercyclical fiscal policy in South Korea
 
Before the crisis, fiscal policy was not used as a stabilization tool in South Korea in any
significant way. The South Korean government emphasized fiscal discipline rather than the
countercyclical stabilization role of fiscal policy. However, after the 1997 crisis, there was
a remarkable shift in the perception of the role of fiscal policy. The credit crunch and
financial market meltdown in the immediate aftermath of the crisis rendered monetary
policy extremely ineffective. The fact that exchange rate stability became one of the major
policy targets also served to limit the flexibility of monetary policy. It was clearly inevitable
that fiscal policy should play a greater countercyclical role in stabilizing the economy.
In this respect, there is a widespread misunderstanding about the characteristics of the
countercyclical fiscal aspects of the IMF program. As is widely known, the IMF stabilization
program that was implemented in South Korea immediately after the crisis in 1997 called
for tight fiscal policy. The initial IMF program announced in December 1997 prescribed
Figure 1 Official and reconstructed consolidated budget balance in South Korea.
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a balanced budget or small budgetary surplus on the expectation that economic growth in
1998 would be around 3%. Criticisms were soon voiced against the tight fiscal policy to the
effect that the IMF was applying a one-size-fits-all prescription to the crisis-hit countries
in Asia without due consideration of their differences: the IMF did not distinguish between
the Asian financial crisis and the financial crises in Latin America. The latter were mainly
a result of large, unsustainable government deficits (Radelet & Sachs, 1998).
The fiscal policy in the IMF program may not have been adequately expansionary to
counter the economic downturn, but one cannot claim that the IMF fiscal program was
contractionary, even though it initially prescribed a balanced or small surplus budget. The
misunderstanding is mainly due to the fact that the official consolidated budget figures do
not include the quasifiscal activities of public finds. As explained, for financial restructuring,
the KDIC and KAMCO issued huge volumes of government-guaranteed bonds immediately
after the crisis. These public funds were used for financial restructuring such as deposit
insurance claims as well as equity participation and NPL purchases from ailing financial
institutions.
Ignoring the large volume of government-guaranteed bonds issued would seriously
distort the true fiscal position of the IMF program. Government-guaranteed bonds issued
by KAMCO and KDIC in 1998 totaled 39 trillion won, which amounted to 55% of the total
government budget in 1998. If these government-guaranteed liabilities are included in the
measurement of the official budget deficits, the ratio of the budget deficit to GDP in 1998
increased from 4 to 15%. The increase in the government-guaranteed bond issuance
together with the tight monetary policy inevitably caused interest rates to rise. To lessen
the pressure on interest rates and to secure long-term fiscal sustainability, the government
and IMF agreed to pay the interest on these newly issued bonds from the government’s
general account. This is the reason the IMF initially prescribed a balanced or small surplus
budget. In summary, the fact that the massive injection of government-guaranteed debt
was not included in the measurement of the official budget shows that the IMF program
in South Korea actually allowed considerable fiscal expansion, unlike IMF programs in
Latin American countries.
Whether the proactive countercyclical fiscal policy in South Korea after the crisis has
been effective is debatable. The positive view posits that consumption and investment
expanded considerably as a result of the large injection of public money for structural
adjustment. Theoretically also, the fiscal multiplier right after the crisis may have been
larger than the conventional multiplier because the majority of fiscal expenditures during
this period were injected into ailing banks and non-bank financial institutions. For this
reason, government expenditures right after the crisis may have had two multiplier effects;
one through the traditional effective aggregate demand channel and the other through
relaxation of the credit crunch, which led to a larger monetary multiplier.
 
4
 
Although the expansionary fiscal policy after the crisis successfully stimulated
the economy and facilitated the development of the financial markets, it also generated
unwelcome side-effects. First, sovereign liabilities increased sharply. As is readily apparent
in Figure 2, the ratio of sovereign liabilities to GDP increased from less than 6% before the
crisis to 32% in 2004. The outstanding volume of treasury bonds accounted for 23% of
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GDP. Government-guaranteed bonds issued by KAMCO and the KDIC accounted for the
bulk of the remaining sovereign liabilities. It is true that the sovereign liability to GDP ratio
in South Korea is still below the average ratio of OECD countries, but South Korea can no
longer be considered a country with a particularly low debt-to-GDP ratio. Second, the
sharp increase in the volume of government-guaranteed bonds and contingent liabilities
undermined fiscal transparency. In particular, after the collapse of the Daewoo Group
in 1999, the government relied heavily on credit guarantee programs such as Primary-
Collateral Bond Obligations (P-CBO) schemes, to deal with the credit crunch at the SME.
However, a large proportion of the beneficiaries under the credit guarantee programs went
bankrupt later, ultimately saddling the government with an even greater fiscal burden.
 
Lessons from fiscal policies
 
Several lesions can be learned from the experience of fiscal policy in South Korea after the
financial crisis.
First, sound fiscal stance in South Korea prior to the crisis was one of the critical
elements contributing to the fast recovery from the crisis. The South Korean government
had to rely heavily on fiscal resources in the process of financial market restructuring and
building social safety nets. This massive injection of public funds was possible because the
South Korean government had maintained fiscal discipline prior to the crisis.
Second, the aggressive fiscal policy during the recovery process raised questions about
the credibility, transparency, and efficiency of many public credit guarantee programs.
During the early stage of economic development, the government-led SME credit support
programs were very effective in selecting and efficiently channeling funds to the most
important investment projects. However, as South Korea became more developed, these
government-led projects and programs naturally lost much of their effectiveness. Now that
the domestic capital market has developed in tandem with the private sector, the recovery
Figure 2 Ratio of public liabilities to gross domestic product in South Korea. KAMCO, Korea Asset
Management Corporation; KDIC, Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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experience reminded the South Korean government of the importance of learning how to
use the private capital market and induce private participation in risk-sharing to improve
the efficiency of fiscal policy.
Third, the South Korean experience shows that countercyclical fiscal policy can be
quite effective when combined with financial restructuring. The fiscal multiplier right
after the crisis may have been larger than the conventional multiplier because the majority
of the fiscal expenditures during this period were injected into ailing banks and non-bank
financial institutions. For this reason, the government expenditures right after the crisis
may have had two multiplier effects; the first through the traditional effective aggregate
demand channel and the second through relaxation of the credit crunch, resulting in a
larger monetary multiplier.
 
2.2 Monetary policy
 
To deal with the crisis itself – stopping bank runs, protecting the payment system, and
stemming capital outflows – the IMF prescribed tight monetary policy.
The overnight call rate rose from 12.5 to 21% on December 5, 1997, and reached 32%
on December 26, 1997. This initial tight monetary policy was aimed at preventing large
currency depreciation from initiating depreciation-inflation spirals. Theoretically, the
increase in interest rates was expected to bring back foreign capital inflows. However, in
reality, it failed to restore foreign investors’ confidence in the midst of the crisis, but was
effective in preventing sharp increase in demand for foreign currency by domestic firms
and individuals and as such, partially contributed to restoring exchange rate stability. The
severe recession induced by the tight monetary policy was also a main factor in reducing
imports and rapidly improving current account balances. Without a significant current
account surplus, restocking foreign reserves and restoring foreign investors’ confidence
would not have been possible.
Whether the initial tightening of monetary policy was too harsh, and consequently
deepened the crisis, is debatable. The contractionary monetary policy was criticized as
having been unnecessary because the economy was suffering from a liquidity problem. It
is implied that the monetary tightening caused many highly leveraged but viable firms to
encounter difficulties in obtaining credit to finance investment and production, thereby
deepening the economic downturn. This is a widely prevailing “credit crunch” view.
Although the high interest rates were cited as evidence of a tight monetary stance in
early 1998, it is not clear how tight the monetary policy stance was at that time.
 
5
 
 Interest
rates alone may not provide an adequate measure of the tightness of monetary conditions.
Devaluation expectations must have pushed up the won interest rates. Higher interest rates
also reflected an increase in perceived default risks. The behavior of monetary aggregates
in 1998 depicted a mixed picture. In particular, broad money (M3) grew in 1998 at roughly
the same rate as in previous years. In contrast, real domestic credit slowed down during
the crisis. But it is not clear how significantly domestic credit conditions tightened.
During the crisis period, both credit supply and demand decreased simultaneously. As
pointed out by Borensztein and Lee (2002), weaknesses in financial institutions and
corporate borrowers explain much of the credit contraction during the crisis. Banks
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needed to increase capital ratios in line with Basel standards, and those institutions unable
to increase equity had to decrease credit to their customers. Banks were also obligated to
be more selective in choosing borrowers under the new financial sector regulations and
environment. The corporate sector as well understood that, under the new conditions, it
had to reduce their high leverage rates.
Regardless of whether money and credit supply was a constraining factor for the South
Korean economy after the crisis, the monetary policy stance changed quickly toward
expansion after mid-1998. The overnight rate started to decline rapidly after reaching a
peak, and by July 1998 it was back at pre-crisis levels. Once the depreciation of the currency
subdued and stability returned to the foreign exchange market, the monetary authority
was able to adjust gradually the interest rates downward and expand money supply. The
swift change to expansionary monetary policy stance supported a quicker recovery of the
South Korean economy from the crisis, compared to the other crisis-hit Asian economies.
Data show that the supply of real credit increased very rapidly since the fourth quarter of
1998 in South Korea, while it remained sluggish in the other crisis-hit Asian economies
(Cho & Rhee, 1999; Park & Lee, 2002). In South Korea, the investment ratio recovered
most quickly from 25 to 29.1% in 1999. In contrast, in other Asian economies, investment
further contracted in 1999.
 
Lessons from monetary and exchange rate policy
 
First, to restore the confidence of international investors and stem capital outflows by both
foreign and domestic investors, it seems hard to deny that a period of high interest rates
was unavoidable. However, the contractionary monetary policy also amplified the pains
from the credit crunch that accompanies structural reform. Therefore, the initial
monetary contraction needs to be temporary only until the exchange market becomes
stabilized.
Second, relaxed monetary policy during the recovery process was effective since
structural reforms were simultaneously pursued. The South Korean experience emphasized
that expansionary macroeconomic policy alone cannot have a large impact if structural
problems remain unsolved. The reform progress reduced sovereign risk premium and
inflation expectation by offsetting the initial worries that the government would monetize
bailing out costs for troubled financial institutions. Because the origin of the crisis has to
do little with macroeconomic imbalances, macroeconomic policy alone cannot solve the
problems. Eventually the recovery must depend on the structural reform that tackles the
roots of the problems that caused the crisis in the first place.
 
3. The Role of Financial Market Development and Structural Reforms
 
In adjustment to the crisis, capital markets, especially government and corporate bond
markets, played an important role in mobilizing financial resources to the real sector. The
fiscal and monetary policies have also had significant effects on the flow of funds in
financial markets. South Korea has also made substantial progress in addressing structural
weaknesses in financial and corporate sectors. This section analyzes the development of
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financial markets and the progress of financial and corporate reforms in the South Korean
economy, and their implications to the recovery process.
 
3.1 The role of financial markets
 
Development of bond markets
 
Before the crisis, bond markets in South Korea remained underdeveloped and did not play
a significant role in the financial system. Because of its history of fiscal conservatism, the
government issued only a small amount of South Korean treasury bonds (KTB) and these
bonds were insufficient to support active secondary trading. As a result, unlike in other
developed countries, the government bond market virtually did not exist in South Korea
prior to the crisis and corporate bonds played a dominant role; 3-year maturity corporate
bonds were the benchmark securities.
Despite its large nominal size, the corporate bond market was also inactive prior to the
crisis. Corporate bonds were essentially disguised bank loans rather than capital market
instruments. South Korean banks routinely guaranteed corporate bonds and held them to
the maturity. Bond investment by banks was an alternative method to extend loans to a
specific company when banks could not extend loans to the company due to loan exposure
regulation. By investing in bonds, banks could escape regulation, which limited loan
exposure per firm, as bond holding was classified as portfolio investment, not loans. These
situations changed drastically with the crisis in both government and corporate bond
markets.
After the financial crisis, issuances of KTB increased dramatically to help fund the cost
of financial restructuring. To finance the cost of recapitalizing and restructuring the
financial system, the government dramatically increased the size of KTB issuance from
around 7 trillion won at the end of 1997 to 56 trillion won at the end of 2004. In addition,
the government took steps to improve the market infrastructure and establish KTB as the
benchmark bond. Institutional reforms played an important part in boosting the liquidity
of the market and establishing the treasury bonds as the benchmark. Reforms included
introducing a Dutch auction system to replace the compulsory underwriting in the
primary market; primary dealer system; delivery versus payment (DVP) clearing and
settlement; reopening and marked-to-market systems; and steps to develop the KTB
futures market and the repurchase market for government bonds. As a result, within a
relatively short period of time, the South Korean government bond market is now one of
the most actively traded bond markets in Asia.
 
6
 
Even though the government bond market developed steadily after the financial crisis
in South Korea, corporate bond market development was a different story. When the crisis
broke at the end of 1997, the South Korean banking system stopped lending in net terms
(i.e. repayments were greater than new loans). However, almost immediately, a corporate
bond market sprang to life, with firms able to obtain funding directly from households. In
essence, the bond market acted as a “spare tire.” The monthly average amount of corporate
bonds issued was less than 3 trillion won prior to the crisis. However, this average increased
to 7 trillion won in the second half of 1998. For all of 1998, the Bank of Korea reported net
bond financing was 45.9 trillion won, about 9.5% of GDP, while there were net repayments
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to the financial intermediaries of 15.9 trillion won. This surge in bond issues was financed
by household savings and the drawing down of bank deposits.
The flow of funds in this fashion, however, was highly concentrated. The Herfindahl
index for gross loan flows was around 1 before the crisis. The Herfindahl index for gross
bond flows was higher, and in 1998, was around 3. This suggests that the largest firms
obtained disproportionately more funds from issuing bonds. Only after the government
placed a limit on the amount of bonds that 
 
chaebols
 
 could issue on October 28, 1998, did
the amount of corporate bonds issued start to decline.
By acting as a “spare tire,” the corporate bond market played an important role in
the fast recovery of the crisis in South Korea when the banking sector was hit hard. Un-
fortunately, however, this spare tire suffered from the inherent weakness in that it signifi-
cantly reduced 
 
chaebol
 
 incentive to restructure. Some 
 
chaebols
 
, especially Daewoo – the third
largest 
 
chaebol
 
 at that time – kept pursuing expansionary strategies financed by bond
issues. When the Daewoo Group collapsed in July 1999, the flow of funds from the
banking sector to the capital market started a complete reverse, posing new challenges
for the South Korean economy. As a large proportion of corporate bonds issued in 1998
became insolvent, the direction of financial flows after the collapse of the Daewoo Group
turned exactly the opposite of what had happened before the Daewoo crisis. The flow of
funds shifted from the corporate bond market to the banking sector, and even to postal
savings institutions. The amount of corporate bonds issued was almost negligible after the
Daewoo crisis, as investors became very sensitive to corporate credit risk. In summary, the
corporate bond market in South Korea experienced roller-coaster movement. After a short
period of booming, the corporate market became illiquid again and South Korea became
a more bank-dependent economy.
 
Lessons
 
Several lessons can be learned from the South Korean experience. First, it suggests that
the government and the corporate bond markets can develop rapidly even where all
finance has previously run through the banking system. It also suggests that the switch
to bond market finance acted as a “spare tire” and softened the blow from the banking
crisis.
Second, the evidence suggests that while bond financing may add flexibility and be an
important tool for the fast recovery of a crisis-hit and bank-dominated economy, such as
South Korea, it may not necessarily be more efficient at allocating resources than the
banking system. Only relatively large firms had access to direct financing via bond or
equity markets. Funding from bonds was even more concentrated than bank lending
before the crisis, despite the fact that the crisis was due in part to large firms over-expanding
based on cheap credit.
Overall, there are two important functions of a financial market: to provide liquidity
and to allocate credit efficiently. The South Korean environment demonstrates that bond
markets can provide liquidity to relatively large firms in bank-dominated emerging
economies, particularly during a banking crisis. However, capital markets have many
prerequisites, such as reliable credit rating agencies, no “too big to fail” beliefs, and so on.
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In their absence, capital markets in emerging economies may allocate credit poorly,
leading to subsequent crises.
Third, for financial restructuring after the crisis, the South Korean experience shows
that more emphasis should be placed on debt-for-equity swaps rather than debt-to-debt
swaps in order to end the vicious circle of credit crunch problems. In the beginning of the
financial crisis, when banks refused to extend loans, corporations had to pay back loans by
issuing bonds with higher interest rates. As the maturities of the bonds issued fell due, they
had to issue new corporate bonds to roll over the previous bonds. As a result of this
debt-to-debt swap, the total amount of corporate debt remained virtually unchanged in
South Korea. The large amount of corporate debt is the main reason for high financial
costs and low interest coverage ratios in the South Korean corporate sector. Regardless of
how much taxpayers’ money is injected into financial restructuring, the chance of another
financial crisis is high if the total amount of corporate debt is not reduced. Hence, financial
restructuring policy should focus on inducing corporations to engage in debt-for-equity
swaps instead of rolling over existing debts.
Fourth, liquid government bond market is a prerequisite for developing well-functioning
capital markets, and the case in South Korea is an ideal example of government-led efforts
to foster the growth of financial market infrastructures. It has several implications for
Asian countries that have tried to develop local bond markets after the financial crisis. In
particular, the South Korean case demonstrates the benefits of a latecomer in developing
government bond markets. Instead of being satisfied with developing an over-the-account
market, South Korea has decided to introduce an electronic trading system for the govern-
ment bond market. Rather than following the path of other countries, the South Korean
government has decided to adopt the most advanced trading system in the world from the
very beginning. This policy turned out to be successful and the electronic trading system
has not only improved the transparency of the market but also increased the liquidity of
the South Korean government bond market.
 
3.2 Progress of corporate and financial restructuring
 
It is widely recognized that the financial crisis in South Korea in 1997 was largely the result
of enormous accumulations of NPL at financial institutions. Therefore, the initial focus of
recovery policy was naturally given to financial restructuring, in particular, of the banking
sector. However, the corporate restructuring issue came to a head as it was soon recognized
that financial restructuring alone could not revitalize the banking sector as long as
underlying corporate sectors did not recover from the crisis. There can be no doubt that
such banking and corporate sector restructuring vehicles were instrumental in South
Korea’s recovery from the crisis.
 
Financial restructuring
 
During the period immediately after the outbreak of the crisis, the financial sector
restructuring focused on the closure of troubled financial institutions and the disposal of
NPL from these institutions. Two supervisory authorities, the Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC) and Financial Supervisory Services (FSS), were newly established by
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integrating four existing supervisory authorities for banks, security houses, insurance
companies, and other financial institutions, leaving policy making to the FSC. Together
with the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), the FSC set the principles and
developed the plans for the resolution of non-viable financial institutions in accordance
with international standards and procedures.
A capital adequacy standard was the basis for identifying troubled financial institu-
tions, and an evaluation committee reviewed the rehabilitation plans. If a rehabilitation
plan was not approved, loan resolution was pursued. If the plan was accepted, the FSC
provided support by disposing of NPL and by other means such as recapitalization. The
FSC and MOFE also formulated policy schemes to facilitate the normalization of financial
institutions. Major means to normalize troubled institutions include transfer of business
units of nonviable financial institutions, purchase and assumption, mergers between
non-viable banks, and mergers between sound banking and non-viable banks.
By June 2003, five banks had closed through purchase and assumption, and 10 banks
had merged with other banks. In addition, 771 non-bank financial institutions were also
closed, and 152 non-bank financial institutions had their licenses revoked; 150 merged,
and 469 underwent restructuring through dissolution, business transfers, and sell-offs. In
this process, the government had to inject a massive amount of public funds for deposit
payments, recapitalization of banks, and purchases of NPL. The actual amount of public
funds employed for financial restructuring totaled 160.5 trillion won. About 50% of public
funds raised were injected into troubled financial institutions through the KDIC, to
redeem insured deposits and for recapitalization. Another 25% was channeled through the
KAMCO to purchase NPL.
This quick and government-financed financial restructuring inevitably weakened the
government’s budget position. But it surely contributed to the fast restoration of financial
stability and sovereign credit rating of South Korea, and laid the foundation for rapid
recovery from the crisis. Moreover, various improvements of financial infrastructures have
been made in the last 10 years. For example, loan classification standards, provision
requirements, and prompt corrective action procedures have been established. Lending
practices and risk management systems have been improved significantly. Comprehensive
disclosure standards for all types of financial institution have been introduced, and the
deposit insurance system has been amended to prevent exposure to moral hazard on the
part of depositors and financial institutions. The government has also made significant
efforts to improve the corporate disclosure system, accounting standard, and credit
evaluation system, and tried to bring its prudential regulations into conformity with inter-
national best practices. As a result, the soundness and efficiency of financial institutions in
South Korea improved significantly after the crisis.
 
Corporate restructuring
 
After the crisis, the initial focus of recovery policy was given to financial sector
restructuring. However, the corporate restructuring issue came to a head as it was soon
recognized that financial restructuring alone could not revitalize the banking sector as
long as underlying corporate sectors could not recover from the crisis. To break the vicious
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cycle of financial and corporate distress, a wide array of corporate restructuring vehicles
were quickly introduced by the government to help distressed firms as well as to help
liquidate NPL in financial sectors. As for the disposal of NPL, since domestic restructuring
vehicles were still at an incipient stage of development, public institutions such as KAMCO
and the foreign restructuring vehicles played leading roles in the restructuring process.
From the outbreak of the crisis in 1997 to October 2005, KAMCO purchased 110 trillion
won (face value) in NPL, of which 72.9 trillion won (face value) worth have been disposed.
Among them, 95 trillion won of NPL were purchased and 45 trillion won of NPL were
disposed before the end of 2000. This clearly demonstrates the importance of KAMCO in
financial and corporate restructuring in the early stage after the crisis. In 2000 and
afterwards, however, the amount of NPL purchased and disposed of by KAMCO declined
as the restructuring of banks and large corporations continued to decline.
As the restructuring of banking sector and large corporations progressed to some
degree, attention moved towards restructuring of the non-banking financial sector and
SME. An array of restructuring vehicles was introduced for corporate restructuring,
including the corporate restructuring corporations (CRC), corporate restructuring
vehicles (CRV), and corporate restructuring funds (CRF), to help turn around ailing
financial and corporate institutions. A CRF, which is a paper company in the form of
mutual funds (corporate-type investment trust), was established with the objective of
providing financial support for SME saddled with excessive burdens of short-term debt,
mainly by investing in their securities. The CRC are the main vehicle that has closely
adhered to its corporate restructuring function, and have indeed played a major role in the
corporate recovery process. The purpose of a CRC is to acquire majority stakes in com-
panies, reshuffle management, or push other restructuring measures as necessary to raise
the company’s value, before reselling. The CRC have doggedly pursued the restructuring
of distressed firms in their role as securities companies (i.e. as non-financial institu-
tions). Compared to the CRV and CRF, which have focused mainly on the resolving and
disposing of NPL, rather than taking on other corporate restructuring tasks, the CRC
arguably have been the main instrument in the restoration and restructuring of distressed
firms.
 
Lessons from financial and corporate restructuring
 
First, early closure of troubled financial institutions and quick resolution of NPL
consumed large amounts of public funds; yet, they were essential for fast restoration of
financial stability and rapid recovery from the crisis in South Korea. However, it seems
quick purchase of NPL from troubled financial institutions are more important than the
quick disposal of NPL. In South Korea, the IMF requested disposal of at least 50% of NPL
that KAMCO acquired through public funds within 3 years. The purpose of this restriction
was understandable. IMF worried that KAMCO could help bail-outs of troubled financial
institutions and wanted to secure repayment of its policy loans. To observe the restriction,
however, KAMCO had to focus more on the expeditious disposal of NPL rather than
maximizing the recovery ratio. As a result, there have been heated controversies over low
selling prices of foreign capital since the crisis.
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Second, it is important to develop domestic NPL markets prior to the crisis. There have
been many critiques that the NPL resolution process in South Korea was excessively
dominated by foreign capital. If we look at the winning bidders of KAMCO’s activity such
as auctions, establishment of joint asset management corporation, CRC, and asset backed
securities (ABS) issuance, they are overwhelmingly dominated by larger foreign players.
Reliance on large foreign players was inevitable in South Korea since the total amount of
NPL was too large to be resolved by South Korean capital only. Undeniably, capital injec-
tion from foreign players contributed significantly to fast recovery from the crisis. In retro-
spect, however, foreign restructuring vehicles have tended to seek out quick capital gains
through the disposal of NPL, instead of trying to rejuvenate ailing companies through
restructuring.
One of the main reasons for low domestic participation is also the lack of “track
record” and “financial knowledge” of domestic financial institutions in the NPL field,
rather than the lack of supply of risky capital itself. To provide opportunities at least for
domestic capitals to compete with foreign players, policy effort has to be given in building
domestic NPL markets so that domestic players can accumulate track records and financial
knowledge in advance.
Third, standardizing NPL information and legal systems was helpful for the efficient
resolution of NPL. Immediately after the crisis, KAMCO did not harmonize record
keeping and IT standards in handling NPL from many financial institutions. Each institu-
tion had its own IT standard and KAMCO had to manually reclassify all NPL from scratch
to determine purchase prices and resolution methods. It significantly delayed the NPL
purchase process and KAMCO was heavily criticized for not moving fast enough when
public funds were ready to be deployed. Only recently, KAMCO developed its own NPL
management system, and the South Korean experience shows the importance of standardizing
the NPL information system prior to the crisis across financial institutions.
In addition, before the crisis, there was no legal system prepared for efficient NPL
disposition such as the 
 
ABS Law
 
, 
 
Consolidated Bankruptcy Act
 
, and 
 
Corporate Restructuring
Promotion Act
 
, and so on. Most importantly, before the establishment of the Public Fund
Oversight Committee, there was no independent governing body with a responsibility for
execution and collection of public funds. In retrospect, establishing legal systems and a
central supervisory committee for monitoring and decision-making of the use of public
funds were major steps in efficient disposition of NPL.
Fourth, the restructuring vehicles introduced immediately after the onset of the
financial crisis have largely focused on addressing the problems of distressed or non-viable
firms. But in the financial and corporate restructuring progress, there is increasing
recognition of the need for 
 
ex ante
 
 restructuring, well before a firm becomes non-viable.
To make a corporation more competitive, the restructuring markets need to give greater
consideration to mergers and acquisition with healthy firms. Furthermore, the increasing
difficulties of injecting public funds indicate that policy should be geared toward encourag-
ing private capital to participate in restructuring markets. On this purpose, the South
Korean government recently approved a bill that allows the establishment of private equity
funds.
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3.3
 
Chaebol
 
 reforms
 
Large conglomerates (
 
chaebols
 
) had a dominating impact on the South Korean economy.
In 1995, for instance, the valued added of the largest 30 groups (excluding the value added
created by their financial affiliates) accounted for 16% of GNP and for 41% of value added
in the manufacturing sector (Borensztein & Lee, 2005).
 
Chaebol
 
 is a conglomerate of many companies in diversified industries. 
 
Chaebol
 
firms are governed by a parent company, which in turn is owned by one family. Thus,
while the direct ownership of the controlling family in 
 
chaebol
 
 firms is typically very
low, the controlling family effectively controls the entire 
 
chaebol
 
 group. Such weak
corporate governance of 
 
chaebol
 
 firms is believed to have caused agency problems
and promoted the so-called “empire-building” tendency in South Korea before the crisis.
 
7
 
At the same time, financial institutions believed that the government would protect the
“too-big-to-fail” 
 
chaebol
 
 from bankruptcies, and financed many risky or unprofitable invest-
ments. Highly leveraged corporate firms were more vulnerable during financial crisis.
 
Chaebol
 
-affiliated firms had a higher debt–equity ratio prior to the crisis than non-
 
chaebol
 
firms. The median of the debt–equity ratio of 
 
chaebol
 
 firms was almost 400% in 1997.
While recognizing that over-diversification of business activities and duplicate
investment in key sectors incurred the low profitability and high leverage of large con-
glomerates, the government urged the top five 
 
chaebols
 
 to focus on core businesses and exit
non-viable businesses. In September 1998, the government and the top five 
 
chaebol
 
 leaders
announced a framework for mergers and business swaps – referred to as “big deals.” The
“big deals” mergers were intended to help the economy by resolving two major problems
in the corporate sectors (i.e. excess capacity and over-leveraging). However, the top
 
chaebols
 
 agreed on the deals only reluctantly, and the swaps have not been particularly
successful. The deals seem to be very hastily driven by government initiative without
sufficient consideration of commercial factors.
There have also been various regulatory changes aimed at improvement in manage-
ment transparency and corporate governance structure. They include the phased
reduction of corporate leverage, elimination of cross-guarantees, consolidation of 
 
chaebol
 
accounts, and improvement of the governance system. One of the most important and
visible changes that occurred during the post-crisis period was the cut in the debt–equity
ratio. After the crisis broke out, the South Korean government introduced a maximum
debt–equity ratio of 200% for all firms, which was to be met by the end of 1999. Con-
sequently, the debt–equity ratio of 
 
chaebol
 
 firms lowered substantially. Nevertheless, some
argue that the reduction in the debt–equity ratio does not represent genuine improvement
in capital structure because it was achieved mainly through increasing equity rather than
reducing debt (see Haggard 
 
et al
 
., 2003).
In addition, the new government regulations posed a credible threat to 
 
chaebols
 
 and
made them decrease investment expenditures perhaps too hastily. In particular, 
 
chaebol
 
-
affiliated firms with a higher debt–equity ratio were forced to reduce investment more
aggressively (Hong 
 
et al
 
., 2006).
During the crisis and subsequent recovery process, South Korea has accomplished a
great deal in alleviating the structural weaknesses of the corporate sector. There has been
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considerable progress in corporate debt and operational restructuring. It appears that in
the post-crisis period, there is no more significant difference in terms of investment ratios
between 
 
chaebols
 
 and non-
 
chaebols
 
. This indicates that over-investment by 
 
chaebols
 
 during
the pre-crisis period, if existed, disappeared after the crisis. It is not clear, however, whether
structural reforms of 
 
chaebol
 
 groups, particularly those with relatively poor governance
structure, were fully successful. Although over the post-crisis period the volume of
investment has declined substantially in 
 
chaebol
 
 groups, investment allocation may not
necessarily become more inefficient.
 
Lessons
 
First, it is clear that 
 
chaebol
 
 restructuring was reasonably well executed in South Korea.
No 
 
chaebol
 
 is “too-big-to-fail” anymore in South Korea. The successful improvement in
management transparency and corporate governance structure must help to increase
long-run profitability of 
 
chaebols and make the South Korean economy more resilient
to external shocks. However, chaebol reforms should be intended to reinforce the
market mechanism in the economy. Some government reform measures after the onset of
the crisis were too hastily introduced without sufficient consideration of commercial
factors, thereby resulting in unfavorable side-effects such as the undue decline in
investment.
Second, the improvement in corporate governance and shareholder capitalism made
the management of chaebols more transparent and is believed to have contributed to
alleviate “Korean discount” in the South Korean stock market. In the last 20 years, the
average rate of return from equity investment has been lower than that of corporate and
government bonds even though its volatility was higher. In other words, risk premium in
the Korean financial market had been negative. Lack of transparency in corporate govern-
ance and tunneling of profits from listed to non-listed companies were blamed as one of
the reasons for this anomaly. However, the situation has changed significantly after the
crisis. Owners of chaebols became sensitive in defending ownership from merger and
acquisition threats and started to pay more attention to dividend payments and short-run
changes in stock prices. These new movements contributed to the rapid growth of stock
prices and the spread of shareholder capitalism after the crisis. However, on the other side
of the coin, they are also making chaebols less enthusiastic about long-term investment
and job creation. Until the South Korean business culture properly adapts to shareholder
capitalism, the discrepancy between financial and real sector performances is expected to
grow.
4. Conclusion
The quick turnaround of the South Korean economy was no less surprising than its sudden
collapse after the financial crisis in 1997. The speedy recovery was supported by the fast
restoration of financial stability due to early closure of non-viable financial institutions
and quick resolution of NPL. The swift macroeconomic adjustment polices as well as the
continuous structural reforms also helped strengthen the recovery process. Corporate
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and government bond markets also played an important role in expediting the
macroeconomic adjustment process.
This paper analyzes these recovery processes of the South Korean economy from the
1997 financial crisis and summarizes some lessons from it. In particular, we emphasize that
the fast recovery from the crisis was not without damage; it generated many unwelcome
side-effects and new challenges to the South Korean economy. The aggressive fiscal
expansion through government guaranteed bonds and public credit guarantee programs
increased sovereign liabilities greatly, thereby deteriorating the transparency of official
fiscal stance. The increase in perceived risk by corporate, financial and household sectors
as well as the introduction of shareholder capitalism, which is new to the South Korean
business culture, contributed to the slowdown of corporate investment, thereby reducing
long-run growth perspective.
Despite the rebound of growth after the crisis, the average growth rates for the
post-crisis period are much lower than the high growth rates of between 7% and 8%
achieved in the decades before the crisis. From 2001 to 2005, the GDP growth averaged
4.5%. One of the main reasons for the drop of the GDP growth rates is the lower investment
rates. Although real GDP growth rates in South Korea have rebounded quickly since 1999,
the economy has not recovered to pre-crisis investment ratios. The investment ratio in
2004 remained at 30.2%, which is far lower than 36% level in the pre-crisis period. The
permanent depression of investment ratios is also evident in the other crisis-hit Asian
economies.
The lower investment rates might be attributed to the adjustment of excessive
investment prior to the crisis. The existing excess capacity prior to the crisis must have
held back new investment. Because the “catching-up” process is expected to slow down
over time, the lower investment rates might indicate that the South Korean economy
has adjusted to a new steady-state growth path (Lee, 2005). However, the lingering depres-
sion of corporate investment rates after the crisis appears to indicate that the investment
rates have dropped below the optimal level.8 How to revive long term investment as
well as growth rates is an open question in South Korea, despite fast recovery from the
crisis.
Notes
1 The amount of net private capital outflows in the last three months of 1997 was $US26.1 billion,
which was equivalent to approximately 6% of the annual GDP in 1997. One reason that such a
large amount of capital was able to leave so quickly was that a substantial portion had short-term
maturity.
2 See Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Blustein (2001) for the detailed description.
3 This paper does not focus on what lessons can be learned from examining the sources of the
South Korean crisis. There has been a substantial volume of literature that analyzes the pre- and
post-crisis development of the South Korean economy. See, for example, the papers in the edited
books by Coe and Kim (2002) and Chung and Eichengreen (2004).
4 Lee et al. (2006) empirically analyze the effectiveness of fiscal policy in South Korea after the
financial crisis.
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5 See Borensztein and Lee (2005) for further discussion.
6 Kang et al. (2005) discuss details of the development of South Korean government bond market.
7 Hong et al. (2006) show empirical evidence that before the 1997 crisis, chaebol firms, particularly
ones with weak corporate governance structure, tended to invest relatively more that stand-alones.
8 The IMF (2005) estimates that the current levels of investment in the majority of East Asian
economies are below their long-run steady-state levels.
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